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QUESTIONING THE UN’S IMMUNITY IN THE 
DUTCH COURTS: UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE 
MOTHERS OF SREBRENICA LITIGATION 
BENJAMIN E. BROCKMAN-HAWE

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Providing victims with a judicial forum where they can air their 
grievances and obtain redress for violations of their rights is regarded as 
the cornerstone of an international culture of accountability. Restrictions 
on the right of access to a court must not run afoul of international law’s 
prohibition on the denial of justice.
1
 The operation of international 
organizations, on the other hand, is predicated on the notion that shielding 
such organizations from the normal processes of foreign law, by providing 
for their immunity before foreign national courts, is the only way to ensure 
their effectiveness.
2
 When an international organization tasked with 
promoting human rights is itself accused of human rights violations, these 
two international norms run afoul of one another, and any resulting 
incompatibility must be resolved. 
The tension between the immunity and the accountability of 
international organizations was recently dealt with by the Dutch Court of 
Appeals in the case of Mothers of Srebrenica v. the Netherlands & the 
 
 
  In 2008, Benjamin Brockman-Hawe received his J.D. from Boston University, where he 
graduated with Honors in the concentration of Public International Law. Since then, he has conducted 
research for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, the American Bar 
Association’s Rule of Law Initiative in Kosovo, and the American Society of International Law. 
Presently he is a Legal Officer with the War Crimes Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Article is 
dedicated to the Maloff family as a token of appreciation for their unwavering support.  
 1. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 34 (1975) (“[I]n civil matters one 
can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the 
courts.”). The right of access to a court is enshrined in many important human rights texts. See, e.g., 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, art. 14 (1), G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (Mar. 23, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6 (1), 
opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1953), amended by 
C.E.T.S. No. 194 (June 1, 2010) [hereinafter ECHR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10, 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 2. Eric Robert, The Jurisdictional Immunities of International Organisations: The Balance 
Between the Protection of the Organisations’ Interests and Individuals Rights, in DROIT DU POUVOIR, 
POUVOIR DU DROIT: MÉLANGES OFFERTS À JEAN SALMON 1433, 1436–38 (Bruylant ed., 2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
728 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:727 
 
 
 
 
United Nations.
3
 This case was not the first before Dutch courts in which 
plaintiffs have sought to hold the Netherlands responsible for the failure of 
Dutch troops operating under a UN mandate to prevent the 1995 attacks 
against Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica,
4
 but it is the first suit to claim the 
UN was jointly and severally liable. This Article examines the judgment 
of the Dutch Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the lower 
court to dismiss the suit against the UN for lack of jurisdiction. 
 II. BACKGROUND  
The Mothers of Srebrenica case stems from the notorious July 1995 
attacks against Bosnian Muslims perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces in the 
East Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica.
5
 Various courts, including the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),6 the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,
7
 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)8 have examined the attacks and confirmed that they 
amounted to genocide. The events leading up to the atrocities of July 1995 
 
 
 3. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations) (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/ 
Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an unofficial 
English version). 
 4. See, e.g., Rb.’s-Gravenhage [District Court] 10 sept. 2008, NJF 2011, (H.N./Netherlands) 
(dismissing claims against the Netherlands as there was no evidence that the Dutch government “cut 
across the United Nations command structure” by ordering Dutch troops to ignore or disobey UN 
orders). The decision was reversed on appeal on the grounds that the Dutch forces were placed in the 
“extraordinary” position of being under the “effective control” of the Dutch Government after 
Srebrenica fell, inasmuch as the Dutch Government retained the “power to prevent” the conduct at 
issue. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations), ¶ 5.11 (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/ 
Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an 
unofficial English version). A separate complaint was also lodged against three members of the Dutch 
troop contingent assigned to protect civilians at Srebrenica in their individual capacities. Hillary 
Stemple, Srebrenica Victims File Complaint Against Dutch Peacekeepers, JURIST (July 7, 2010, 2:33 
PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/07/srebrenica-victims-file-complaint-against-dutch-peacekeep 
ers.php. 
 5. See Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/675945.stm (last 
updated June 9, 2005) (providing a timeline of the events leading up to the Srebrenica massacre from 
July 6 through July 17, 1995). 
 6. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26). 
 7. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milorad Trbić, Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oct. 16, 2009, No. 
X-KR-07/386 (Court of Bosn. & Herz.); Prosecutor v. Milos Stupar, Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
July 29, 2008, No. X-KR-05/24 (Bosn. & Herz.). 
 8. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004.). 
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were recently summarized by Trial Chamber II of the ICTY in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Popovic:  
In early July, these two United Nations protected areas [Srebrenica 
and Žepa], established as havens for civilians caught up in the 
calamity of war, were the subject of intense military assault by 
Bosnian Serb Forces. The United Nations protection forces in both 
places were disabled and rendered powerless. In Srebrenica, the 
terrified Bosnian Muslim population fled to the nearby town of 
Potočari. There, in the face of a catastrophic humanitarian situation, 
the women, children and the elderly were ultimately loaded onto 
packed buses and transported away from their homes in Eastern 
Bosnia. For a large proportion of the male population, who were 
separated, captured or had surrendered, a cataclysmic fate awaited 
them. Thousands of them were detained in horrific conditions and 
subsequently summarily executed.
9
 
In 1996, the Dutch government asked the Netherlands Institute for War 
Documentation (“Institute”) to explain the failure of the United Nations 
Protection Force (“UNPROFOR”), specifically its 400-strong Dutch troop 
component (“Dutchbat”), to effectively deter the Srebrenica attacks.10 In 
2002, the Institute published its findings (“Report”), which blamed the 
Dutch Government and senior military officials for handing over Bosnian 
Muslim civilians to Serb forces.
11
 The Report also blamed the United 
Nations for failing to provide proper support to Dutchbat.
12
 With respect to 
 
 
 9. Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 10, 2010). The Trial Chamber confirmed that it was “satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that at least 5,336 identified individuals were killed in the executions following the fall of 
Srebrenica” and noted that “the evidence before it is not all encompassing. . . . The Trial Chamber 
therefore considers that the number could well be as high as 7,826.” Id. ¶ 664. For a more 
comprehensive account of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of UNPROFOR and the 
withdrawal of Dutch troops from Srebrenica, see U.N. Secretary-General, The Fall of Srebrenica: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 
15, 1999) [hereinafter U.N. Report, The Fall of Srebrenica], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/4e8fe0c73ec7e4cc80256839003eeb04?Opendocument.  
 10. See, e.g., NIOD Report on Srebrenica, ARIRUSILA (July 12, 2011), http://arirusila.cafebabel 
.com/en/post/2011/12/07/NIOD-Report-on-Srebrenica. 
 11. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR WAR DOCUMENTATION [NIOD], SREBRENICA: A ‘SAFE’ 
AREA, PART II, DUTCHBAT IN THE ENCLAVE (2002), available at http://arirusila.cafebabel.com/en/ 
post/2011/12/07/NIOD-Report-on-Srebrenica. The “6,000-page account” has been criticized by 
various scholars, including those who worked on it, for the fact that its length allows individuals to 
“draw different conclusions from different parts of the book.” See Karen Meirik, Controversial 
Srebrenica Report Back on Table, IWPR (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/contro 
versial-srebrenica-report-back-table. 
 12. NIOD, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
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the command relationship between the United Nations and the Dutch 
battalion, the Report concluded that Dutchbat was under the “operational 
control” of the United Nations but had acted independently in its 
administration of the Srebrenica Safe Zone.
13
 
The events of July 1995 had a profound impact on the Dutch 
government and the United Nations. The publication of a report critical of 
the role the Dutch government played in Srebrenica resulted in the 
resignation of the entire Dutch Cabinet in 2002, and the question of 
whether the Netherlands should apologize for its role in the killings 
remains controversial.
14
 Srebrenica also became a permanent stain on the 
reputation of UN. In 1999, the UN Secretary–General, Kofi Annan, 
acknowledged “[t]he tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history 
forever.”15 His successor, Ban Ki-Moon, echoed his predecessor’s 
sentiment at a 2010 memorial ceremony for the Srebrenica victims, 
admitting that “[t]he United Nations made serious errors of judgment in 
Srebrenica, which weigh heavy on our collective memory and 
conscience.”16  
On June 4, 2007, the Mothers of Srebrenica Association, a Bosnian 
non-governmental organization (“NGO”), and ten individual plaintiffs 
commenced a civil action against the Dutch government of the 
Netherlands and the United Nations in the District Court of The Hague.
17
 
The plaintiffs sought compensation from both the Netherlands and the 
 
 
 13. Id. at 15. 
 14. Dutch Government Quits Over Srebrenica, BBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2002, 15:54 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1933144.stm; On 11 July 2010 the Dutch Minister of Defense 
refused to apologize for the Srebrenica massacre, stating that if anyone should apologize, it should “be 
the United Nations as the international community failed in the events surrounding the fall of 
Srebrenica.” Former Dutch Minister Jan Pronk, however, continues to pressure the government to 
accept responsibility. Excuses Srebrenica meer zaak van VN, de Volkskrant (11 July 2010), http:// 
www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2668/Buitenland/detail/1009328/2010/07/11/Excuses-Srebrenica-meer-zaak-van 
-VN.dhtml. Jan Pronk: ‘Verantwoodjelijkheid Srebrenica nog steeds ontkend’, de Volkskrant (11 July 
2010), http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2668/Buitenland/article/detail/1009416/2010/07/22Jan-Pronk-Isquo-
Verantwoordelijkheid-Srebrenica-nog-steeds-ontkend.dhtml. 
 15. U.N. Report, The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 9, ¶ 503. The failure of UN forces to protect 
civilians at Srebrenica and in Rwanda provided the impetus for the UN to substantially reform its 
peacekeeping practices. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Aug. 21, 2000 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. Brahimi Report]. 
 16. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at Commemoration of Srebrenica Massacre, Stresses Need 
For All, Including United Nations, to Learn From Past Errors, U.N. DEP’T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION 
SG/SM/13008 (July 12, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsm13008 
.doc.htm. 
 17. Rb.’s-Gravenhage [District Court] 10 july 2008, (Ass’n of Citizens Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands), ¶ 1 (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true& 
searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD6796&u_ljn=BD6796 (translating the case in an unofficial English version).  
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United Nations as co-defendants.
18
 Additionally, the plaintiffs sought to 
compel both co-defendants to accept moral responsibility for the events at 
Srebrenica.
19
 On July 10, 2008 the district court determined that it was not 
competent to hear the action brought against the United Nations on 
account of its immunity from suit before national courts.
20
 The Court of 
Appeals upheld the verdict of the District Court, in the process considering 
whether: (a) the state could assert the immunity of the UN, (b) the 
immunity enjoyed by the UN was absolute or limited in scope, and (c) a 
conflict regarding the right of access to a court justified setting aside the 
UN’s immunity.21 This Article discusses these three aspects of the Court 
of Appeals decision, referencing the District Court decision where 
necessary to illustrate important points of convergence or departure. 
III. THE IMMUNITY OF THE UN  
A. Asserting the UN’s Immunity Before Dutch Courts 
The UN routinely declines to appear before national courts, instead 
invoking its immunity through letters sent to the Permanent Representative 
of the host state of the national court where jurisdiction is sought.
22
 The 
Mothers of Srebrenica case proved to be no exception, and it was left to 
the Netherlands to assert the immunity of its co-defendant before the 
Dutch courts.
23
 Because the plaintiffs raised objections relating to the 
capacity of the Netherlands to petition on behalf of its co-defendant,
24
 the 
Dutch courts were faced with the procedural question of whether the 
Netherlands had an “interest in the outcome of the proceedings” sufficient 
to justify its appearance on behalf of the UN before the Dutch courts.
25
 
 
 
 18. Id. ¶ 2.1 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. ¶ 6.1. 
 21. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations) (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/ 
Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an unofficial 
English version). 
 22. See Anthony Miller, The Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 6 INT’L ORG. L. 
REV. 7, 41 (2009). 
 23. Rb.’s-Gravenhage [District Court] 10 july 2008 (Ass’n of Citizens of Mothers of Srebrenica/ 
the Netherlands), § 5.13 (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Dutch%20 
cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an unofficial English 
version). 
 24. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 2.2; Rb.’s-Gravenhage 
[District Court], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 3.4. 
 25. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 2.5; Rb.’s-Gravenhage 
[District Court], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.6. 
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Consistent with the District Court decision,
26
 the Court of Appeals held 
that the State had  
a reasonable interest in a Netherlands court not delivering any 
judgments which conflict with the immunity granted to the UN . . ., 
because in that case the State, to whom such ruling should be 
imputed under international law, would violate its obligations 
arising from [Article 105 of the Charter and Article II § 2 of the 
Convention.]
27
 
Thus, both courts held the Netherlands’ assertion of immunity for the UN 
was procedurally proper. 
Domestic courts are placed in a tough position when national 
governments assume conflicting international responsibilities. While 
principles of justice forbid judges from abstaining on the grounds that the 
legislative branches have not made it clear which obligations they have 
prioritized, separation-of-powers principles prohibit courts from taking a 
position on matters affecting the foreign relations of the state.
28
 These 
problems are exacerbated when one of the international obligations in 
question is to secure the fundamental rights of a petitioner. Keeping in 
mind that in Mothers of Srebrenica the Dutch courts potentially faced the 
difficult choice of either forcing the Netherlands to violate its UN Charter 
responsibilities or setting the stage for a claim before the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) that 
the Netherlands violated its international law obligation to provide access 
to a court, it is not a surprise that both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals permitted the Netherlands to intervene and explain its legal and 
political priorities. Importantly, these Dutch court decisions allowed the 
Netherlands to discharge its duty under the majority decision by the ICJ in 
Cumaraswamy “to inform its courts of the position taken by the Secretary-
General” concerning the UN’s immunity and ensure that the courts 
consider the issue of immunity as a threshold matter in limine litis.
29
 There 
 
 
 26. Rb.’s-Gravenhage [District Court], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.6. 
 27. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 2.5. 
 28. Alexandra Weerts, Les Immunites des Organizations Internationales Face a L ‘article 6 de la 
Convention Europeans des Doritos de L’homme, 134 J. DU DROIT INT’L 3, 24 (2007).  
 29. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, ¶¶ 62–63 (Apr. 29) [hereinafter 
Cumaraswamy]. The ICJ’s opinion is ambiguous as to whether the duty of state authorities to bring an 
affirmative finding of immunity by the Secretary-General of the UN to the attention of a national court 
is triggered by the Secretary-General’s explicit request that such measures are taken, or whether state 
authorities are under an independent obligation to do so before their national courts on their own 
motion. Id. ¶¶ 60–61. The latter interpretation was favored by Judge Oda. Id. ¶ 21 (Oda, concurring). 
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is no indication, however, that the Dutch courts specifically considered 
Cumaraswamy. 
B. The Scope of the Immunity of the UN 
The UN’s procedural immunity from suit before national courts is 
provided for, in general terms, by Article 105(1) of the UN Charter, which 
states that “[t]he Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
fulfillment of its purposes.”30 The Privileges and Immunities Convention 
further defines these immunities in Article II, Section 2, which states that 
“[t]he United Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal 
process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its 
immunity.”31 The apparent functionally-limited grant of immunity 
provided for in the UN Charter has historically been regarded as 
embodying a standard of absolute immunity, insofar as “international 
organizations can only act within the scope of their functional personality 
[and] there is no room left for non-functional acts for which immunity 
would be denied.”32 In recent years, however, the scholarly community has 
come to regard the functional approach as overbroad, and now generally 
encourages courts to adopt a “strict-functionality” test that would limit the 
 
 
Judge Koroma, however, denied that Malaysia was responsible for implementing its Convention 
obligations in the specific manner suggested by the majority at all and would seem therefore to favor 
the latter interpretation. Id. ¶ 28 (Koroma, dissenting); see also Guido den Dekker & Jessica 
Schechinger, The Immunity of the United Nations Before the Dutch Courts Revisited, THE HAGUE 
JUSTICE PORTAL 2 (June 4, 2010), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/11/748.html (“[T]he 
State would be responsible for violations of international law if national courts would deny immunity 
contrary to the UN Charter, Article 105, and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, Article II(2), . . . . This finding of legitimate involvement of the State in the 
proceedings is in line with an opinion of the [ICJ] stating that every Member State has an obligation 
pursuant to Article 105 of the UN Charter to see to it that its national courts deal with the question of 
UN immunity as a preliminary matter.”). 
 30. U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. The UN 
Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 and entered into force on Oct. 24, 1945. 
 31. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. 2(2), Feb. 13, 1946, 21 
U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 16, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume% 
201/volume-1-I-4-English.pdf. The Netherlands has been a party to this treaty since April of 1948. Id. 
 32. August Reinisch & Ulf Andreas Weber, In the Shadow of Waite and Kennedy, 1 INT’L ORG. 
L. REV. 59, 63 (2004). Reinisch also noted that “the idea of functional immunity is rather imprecise 
insofar as it could refer both to the rationale of granting immunity at all . . . as well as to a certain 
content of immunity to be accorded.” AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE 
NATIONAL COURTS 331 (2000) [hereinafter NATIONAL COURTS]. Furthermore, “many scholars and 
judges consider . . . ‘functional’ and ‘absolute’ [to be] synonymous qualifications.” Id. at 332–33; see 
also Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the UN is 
absolutely immunized from suit before U.S. courts). 
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application of the UN’s immunity to activities that are necessary for the 
exercise of its functions or fulfillment of its purposes.
33
  
The Mothers of Srebrenica argued that the UN could only possess a 
strict-functional immunity, on the basis that “the Convention cannot 
extend further than the superior ranked U.N. Charter.”34 The question of 
the scope of the immunity granted to the UN would prove to be a point of 
departure between the Dutch Court of Appeals and District Court. The 
District Court seemed to favor the approach suggested by the plaintiffs.
35
 
Although it ostensibly denied that the UN Immunities Convention and UN 
Charter “offer[ed] grounds for restricting the immunity,”36 the District 
Court ended up dismissing the case on the grounds that the impugned acts 
were within the functional scope of the UN’s authority.37 The Court of 
Appeals was less receptive to the strict-functional approach and decided 
that Article II section 2 of the UN Convention and Article 105(3) of the 
UN Charter granted the UN “the most far-reaching immunity, in the sense 
that the UN cannot be brought before any national court of law in the 
countries that are a party to the Convention.”38  
 
 
 33. See, e.g., NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 32, at 339–41; Jordan Paust, The U.N. Is Bound By 
Human Rights: Understanding the Full Reach of Human Rights, Remedies, and Nonimmunity, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. (2010); PETER H. F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 39 (1994); Emmanuel Gaillard and Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, International 
Organizations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: To Restrict or to Bypass, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 5 
(2002); PIERRE KLEIN, LA RESPONSABILITÉ DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES DANS LES 
ORDRES JURIDIQUES INTERNES ET EN DROIT DES GENS 230 (1998); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS 
M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 351 (3d rev. ed. 1995).  
 34. M.R. GERRITSEN ET AL., VAN DIEPEN VAN DER KROEF ADVOCATEN, STATEMENT OF 
APPEAL, ¶ 80 (Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF APPEAL], available at http://www.vandiepen 
.com (providing statement on behalf of Mothers of Srebrenica). 
 35. Rb.’s-Gravenhage [District Court] 10 july 2008 (Ass’n of Citizens Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands), ¶¶ 3.4(5), 5.11 (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx? 
snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD6796&u_ljn=BD6796 (translating the case in an unofficial 
English version). Contra Otto Spijkers, The Immunity of the United Nations in Relation to the 
Genocide in Srebrenica in the Eyes of a Dutch District Court, 13 J. OF INT’L PEACEKEEPING 197, 206 
(2009); Dekker & Schechinger, supra note 29, at 4; Miller, supra note 22, at 40. 
 36. Rb.’s-Gravenhage [District Court], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.16. The District Court also 
asserted in dicta that “in international law practice the absolute immunity of the U.N. is the norm and 
is respected.” Id. ¶ 5.13. 
 37. Id. ¶ 5.12 (“It is particularly for acts within this framework that immunity from legal process 
is intended.”). Additionally, the District Court suggested that national courts could review the acts of 
the UN for compatibility with Article 105 with “the greatest caution and restraint,” and “if and insofar 
as it has scope for testing, [it] proceed[s] . . . with the utmost reticence.” Id. ¶¶ 5.14, 5.15. 
 38. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations), ¶ 4.2 (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal 
.net/Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an 
unofficial English version).  
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The Dutch Court of Appeals is one of only a handful of judicial 
institutions to have evaluated the scope of the UN’s immunity on the basis 
of the international law obligations embodied in the UN Convention and 
Charter, as opposed to domestic laws that have incorporated those 
international law obligations.
39
 Interestingly, the Dutch Court of Appeals 
decision deviated from the precedent set by the Belgian Civil Tribunal in a 
decision from several decades earlier. In Manderlier, the Belgian Tribunal 
concluded that the UN Charter embodied only the immunities that 
“necessity strictly demands for the fulfillment of the [UN’s] purposes,” but 
that these immunities had been expanded by Section II of the 
Convention.
40
 The Dutch Court of Appeals turned this analysis on its head, 
concluding that the UN Convention had not gone “beyond the scope 
allowed by Article 105 of the Charter.”41 The Dutch court went on to 
explain that 
the question that needs to be addressed is not whether the invocation 
of immunity in this particular case . . . is necessary for the 
realization of the objectives of the UN, but whether it is necessary 
for the realization of those objectives that the UN is granted 
immunity from prosecution in general.
42
  
Answering in the affirmative, the court noted the risk that the UN—the 
sole international body authorized to exercise “far-reaching powers” in the 
maintenance or restoration of peace and security—would be prevented 
from fulfilling its purpose by opportunistic or frivolous litigation if it were 
afforded anything less than absolute immunity.
43
 
 
 
 39. Most national courts assess the scope of immunity granted to an international organization on 
the basis of domestic legislation providing for such immunity. See Entico Corp. v. UNESCO, 2008 
U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 477, 481–85, paras. 20–26 (assessing the immunity of UNESCO in light of the 
International Organisations Act of 1968); De Luca v. United Nations Organization, 841 F. Supp. 531, 
533 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (considering the immunity of the United Nations in light of the U.S. International 
Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”)) (citations omitted). The IOIA provides that international 
organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments.” International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) 
(2006).  
 40. Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies et l’État Belge, Brussels Civil Tribunal, 11 
May 1966, 45 I.L.R. 446, 453 (Belg.); Court of Appeals of Brussels, 15 Sept. 1969, 69 I.L.R. 139 
(Belg.). For more on the Manderlier case, read Jean Salmon, De Quelques Problèmes Posés aux 
Tribunaux Belges par les Actions de Citoyens Belges contre l’O.N.U. en Raison de Faits Survenus sur 
le Territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo, 81 JT 713, 714 (1966). 
 41. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], 30 mart 2010, Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 4.4. 
 42. Id. ¶ 4.5 (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. ¶ 5.7. 
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Although the “in-general” test suggested by the Dutch Court of 
Appeals has found support amongst academics
44
 and is consistent with the 
decisions of other national courts that have accepted the UN’s virtually 
absolute immunity,
45
 the suggestion that a national court cannot decide 
whether immunity is “necessary” for the functioning of the international 
organization in light of the specific circumstances of a particular case is 
problematic for legal and policy reasons. First, the decision ignores the 
reality, acknowledged by various branches of the UN itself, that the UN’s 
immunity is not unlimited and it does not cover all situations where its 
application would be convenient. The UN Office of Legal Affairs 
(“OLA”) has concluded time and again that the immunity granted in the 
UN Convention and Charter does not extend to its participation in 
commercial enterprises or in competitive bidding process.
46
 This 
acknowledgement comports with the UN General Assembly’s 
understanding that immunities have an “outer limit” beyond which “no 
 
 
 44. Dekker & Schechinger, supra note 29, at 3 (“[I]f a national court could decide whether 
immunity was ‘necessary’ for the functioning of the international organization in a given case, the 
essence of functional immunity would be lost for all practical purposes.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Manderlier, 45 I.L.R. at 453; 69 I.L.R. at 139.  
 46. Advisability of the United Nations Entering Into a Profit-Making Joint Venture with a Private 
Publishing Firm—Purpose of the Current Commercially Oriented Activities of the United Nations—
Participation in a Profit-Oriented Commercial Joint Venture Could Put the Status and Character of 
the Organization in Question, 1990 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 257, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/ 
UNJuridicalYearbook/pdfs/english/ByVolume/1990/chpVI.pdf. The UN Office of Legal Affairs 
(“OLA”) acknowledged that if “the Organization were to participate in a commercial joint venture, it 
would . . . have to waive its privileges and immunities, the granting of which would no longer be 
justified.” Id.; see also Miller, supra note 22, at 21–22 n.45 (describing other incidents in which the 
OLA of the UN has recommended against undertaking a particular activity on the grounds that it 
would exceed the functional mandate of the UN and expose it to liability); Frederik Rawski, To Waive 
or Not To Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L 
L. 103, 123 (2002) (“[A]pplication of the Convention has been inconsistent and UN rhetoric has been 
confused. At various times, both the broad and narrow interpretations of immunity protections have 
been invoked, with [UN] officials sometimes calling for a waiver and other times defining certain 
activities outside the scope of immunity.”). This position was also taken by the High Court of Kenya. 
Tanad Transporters Ltd., Applicant, v. United Nations Children’s Fund, Ruling of 1 July 2009, 2009 
U.N. Jurid Y.B. 487, 488, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/UNJuridicalYearbook/pdfs/english/ 
ByVolume/2009/chpVIII.pdf (“[F]or the applicant to succeed in its claim that this court has 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute, it must establish that the commercial activity exercised by the 
respondent is outside its official function. In the present application, it is clear that the transportation 
agreement between the applicant and the respondent related to the official function of the 
respondent.”); see also Participation of Organizations of the United Nations System in Competitive 
Bidding Exercises Conducted by Governments, 1999 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 418, 423, available at http:// 
untreaty.un.org/cod/UNJuridicalYearbook/pdfs/english/ByVolume/1999/chpVII.pdf (“If the practice 
of United Nations system organizations competing with private companies for business were to be 
pursued, it cannot be a priori excluded that the immunity of such organizations might be challenged in 
court. Whether this would occur and the possible results are difficult to predict. Even if the United 
Nations system organizations were to prevail in such legal actions, the institution of such actions 
conceivably could have other implications.”). 
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privileges and immunities which are not really necessary should be asked 
for,”47 as well as the understanding of the ICJ, which has explicitly found 
that the UN’s purposes “are broad indeed, but neither they nor the powers 
conferred to effectuate them are unlimited.”48 If the UN’s immunity is not 
absolute, there is nothing to prevent national courts from exploring the 
limits of that immunity. 
Second, it is troubling that the “in-general” test shifts the focus of the 
inquiry away from the scope of the UN’s immunity, as provided for in its 
foundational documents, and towards the effects of allowing a suit to 
proceed against the accused organizations. The dangers of this approach 
may be seen in the following example. Imagine a situation in which two 
identical claims are brought against an organization with a limited 
mandate but afforded broad immunity. In one of these cases, the plaintiffs 
seek substantial damages, which, if awarded, would bankrupt an 
international organization. In the second case, a much more modest 
amount is sought. By the logic of the Dutch Court of Appeals, the first 
case should be dismissed, for the sole reason that, if pursued, the claims 
may lead to an impairment of organization’s ability to function, whereas 
the second claim should be allowed to proceed on the basis of its limited 
impact. While it is unlikely that a national court would actually decide a 
case on this basis, this example does indicate the capriciousness of the 
effects-focused “in-general” test. 
Finally, the “in-general” test takes as a given that providing for the 
absolute immunity of the UN is the only way to insulate it from malicious 
or frivolous litigation and provide for its effective functioning. This notion 
does not, however, correspond with today’s realities. Considering the 
position of international organizations in the contemporary world, one 
academic concluded: 
The argument that international organizations need expansive 
immunities to achieve their organizational purposes overlooks the 
current size, stature, and influence of many of these institutions. 
Expansive jurisdictional immunity arguably may have been a 
functional requirement a half century ago when these international 
organizations were fledgling, under-resourced, and politically 
precarious. But this is hardly the case today. The most prominent 
international organizations are now well-funded and firmly 
 
 
 47. G.A. Res. 1/22A(1), § D, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1/22A(1) (Feb. 13, 1946). 
 48. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20) 
(discussing the article 17, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter). 
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established in the international system, and have considerable legal 
and political resources at their disposal to defend their independence 
and organizational prerogatives. In fact, the power and influence of 
the more prominent organizations have expanded to the point where 
they are largely insulated from overreaching by most of their 
member states.
49
 
Although, in all probability, the UN’s impugned acts and decisions 
during the 1995 attacks did fall within the scope of its functional 
immunity, it is nevertheless unfortunate that the Dutch Court of Appeals 
chose the path of least resistance and immunized the UN from suit in a 
manner that far exceeds its legitimate functional needs and contravenes the 
demands of international law and public policy. In light of the 
shortcomings discussed above, other courts adjudicating claims against 
international organizations should be wary of following the rationale in the 
precedent set by the Dutch Court of Appeals in Mothers of Srebrenica. 
C. Providing Access to a Court: Immunity and the Jurisdiction of the 
Dutch Courts 
In the final section of its judgment, the Dutch Court of Appeals 
addressed the appellant’s arguments that the immunity of the UN should 
be set aside by the Dutch courts on the basis of their right of access to a 
court, as embodied in Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 
According to the court, the duty of the Netherlands to provide access to a 
court was not displaced by Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides 
that in the event of a conflict between the Charter obligations of UN 
members and their obligations under another international agreement, their 
Charter obligations prevail.
50
 According to the court: 
The development of international law since 1945, the year the 
Charter was signed, has not stopped and shows an increasing 
attention for and recognition of fundamental rights, that cannot be 
ignored by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, as is clear from the 
preamble to the Charter and Article 1 Subsection 3 of the Charter, 
 
 
 49. Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the Anachronism of 
Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 522 (2008). 
 50. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations), ¶ 5 (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/ 
Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an unofficial 
English version). 
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the UN explicitly has as its purpose the promotion and 
encouragement of respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms. It is implausible that Article 103 of the Charter intends to 
impair the enforcement of such fundamental rights.
51
 
While it is true that Article 103 was not drafted for the purpose of 
freezing human rights at 1945 levels, it was intended to preempt the 
displacement of the terms of the UN Charter by subsequent treaties, even 
human rights treaties, which would seem to be precisely the situation 
faced by the Dutch Court of Appeals in Mothers of Srebrenica. The failure 
to address this issue head-on erodes confidence in the soundness of the 
court’s opinion. 
Moreover, the decision to test Article 103 against the right of access 
embodied in Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR, as 
opposed to the right as a matter of customary law capable of being 
invoked independently of the treaty provision, as the Dutch Court of 
Appeals had acknowledged earlier in its opinion,
52
 is unfortunate for three 
reasons. First, had the court fully committed to the “customary law” line 
of reasoning, it could have sidestepped the Article 103 issue entirely, as 
the UN Charter asserts no primacy over international custom.
53
 Second, 
testing the Charter against the ECHR and ICCPR predisposed the Dutch 
Court of Appeals towards considering the limits on the right of access that 
have been inferred by the bodies responsible to interpreting those 
treaties.
54
 Had the court considered the right of access as it appears as a 
matter of customary international law, it may have reached a different 
conclusion. Finally, the decision of the court to acknowledge the right of 
access as both a treaty and customary right raises a question as to why the 
court did not concomitantly consider whether the duty to enforce the UN’s 
immunity was also a customary international law obligation.
55
  
 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. ¶ 5.1 (“For because the question whether the Mothers of Srebrenica fall under 
Netherlands jurisdiction within the meaning of article 1 ECHR, or reside within Netherlands territory 
or are subject to Netherlands jurisdiction within the meaning of article 2 ICCPR cannot unequivocally 
be answered in the affirmative, the Court of Appeal finds that the right to a fair trial and the right of 
access to a court of law it entails is a matter of customary law, which can be invoked independently of 
the preceding provisions.”). 
 53. Id. ¶ 5.5. 
 54. Id. ¶ 5.2. 
 55. Contra Question of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, of Representative 
Member States and Officials of the Organization, 1967 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 311, 314, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.C/5, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/UNJuridicalYearbook/html/volumes/1967/ 
dtSearch/Search_Forms/dtSearch.html (asserting that the terms of the General Convention had become 
part of the customary law governing the relations between the United Nations and member states); 
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Interestingly, the Dutch Court of Appeals never made an affirmative 
finding that Article 6 was engaged, but instead merely assumed that the 
case fell within the remit of the ECHR.
56
 Arguably, because the ECHR 
obliges States only to extend ECHR protections to everyone “within their 
jurisdiction,” granting immunity to an international organization removes 
the acts of that organization from the scope of national jurisdiction and, 
therefore, removes the UN from the subject matter jurisdiction, or ratione 
materiae, of the European Convention.  
The English courts have followed this “no-conflict” approach of 
denying the relevance of Article 6 to international immunities. This 
reasoning was followed with respect to organizational immunities in 2008 
by Justice Tomlinson, who denied the necessity of considering the 
relationship between UNESCO’s immunity and Article 6 of the ECHR as 
the United Kingdom “possessed no jurisdiction over UNESCO unless 
UNESCO chose to waive its immunity” when the United Kingdom 
became party to the ECHR.
57
 It is regrettable that the Dutch Court of 
Appeals did not choose to engage in a meaningful, judicial dialogue and 
address this jurisdictional concern.
58
 
After determining that the right of access to a court applied to the case 
under Article 6 of the ECHR, the Dutch Court of Appeals considered 
whether the grant of immunity to the UN reflected an appropriate 
restriction of that right. The court applied the criteria developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) in Beer and Reagan 
v. Germany and Waite and Kennedy as to when immunity may be set 
 
 
Walter Gary Sharp, Sr. Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L LAW 93, 128 (1996) (arguing that the provisions of the General Convention “have reached 
such universal acceptance that they are now considered customary international law.”); NATIONAL 
COURTS, supra note 32, at 167; HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 1007 (3d rev. ed. 1995); C. F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 400 (1996). 
 56. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations), ¶¶ 5.2–5.5 (Neth.), available at http://www.hagueju-ticeportal 
.net/Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an 
unofficial English version). 
 57. Entico Corporation Limited, Claimant, against the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, Intervenor, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), Defendant, Decision of 28 March 2008, 2008 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 477, 487 
[hereinafter UNESCO], available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/UNJuridicalYearbook/pdfs/english/By 
Volume/2008/chpVIII.pdf.  
 58. MATTHIAS KLOTH, IMMUNITIES AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURT UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 28–30 (2010) (suggesting that the approach of the 
English Courts is flawed because national courts have jurisdictions until it is affirmatively removed by 
the grant of immunity). 
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aside.
59
 According to the European Court, the right of access is not 
absolute and national authorities may impose limits on the right that (1) do 
not inhibit its “essence,” (2) serve a legitimate goal, and (3) are 
“proportionate to the goal pursued” by the state or international 
organization.
60
  
Here again we see the practice of the English courts diverging from 
that of the Dutch courts. The Dutch Court of Appeals quickly disposed of 
the legitimacy requirement by concluding that immunity had been granted 
for the purpose of promoting the effective operation of the UN.
61
 In the 
UNESCO case, Justice Tomlinson found that the appropriate question to 
ask with respect to the legitimacy of the immunity of a UN subsidy was 
whether the grant pursued the aim of “compliance with obligations owed 
in international law.”62  
This Article contends that the Dutch Court of Appeals has adopted the 
better position. Justice Tomlinson’s judgment implies that grants of 
immunity more expansive than those required by international law are 
illegitimate per se. But it is not unimaginable that a state would choose to 
grant an international organization more expansive immunity than that 
demanded by international law, as embodied in an organization’s charter, 
any treaties to which the state is a party, or custom. In the absence of a 
general rule of international law to the effect that only the narrowest 
possible immunities are to be granted, the “purpose” test is arguably 
superior because it affords governments the flexibility to go beyond 
international law in their relationships with international organizations 
without reducing the legitimacy inquiry to a mere cypher. Such argument 
assumes that the test is applied robustly by the domestic courts of the 
immunity-granting state.  
The Dutch Court of Appeals assessed the proportionality of the 
Netherland’s restriction on the right of access, taking into account the 
“special position” of the UN as the only international organization 
 
 
 59. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010, Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.12 (citing 
Beer & Regan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 
App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999)). 
 60. Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Hof’s-Gravenhage 
[Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010, Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.12. The question of whether the plaintiffs 
had recourse to alternative fora was an “important aspect” of the proportionality inquiry but would not 
be determinative. Id. ¶ 5.2. 
 61. Id. ¶ 5.6. 
 62. UNESCO, supra note 57 (citing Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273 
(2001); Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 302 (2001); McElhinney v. Ireland, 34 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 323 (2001)). 
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authorized to use force to preserve international peace. According to the 
Court of Appeals: 
In connection with these extensive powers, which may involve the 
UN and the troops made available to them in conflict situations 
more often than not entailing conflicting interests of several parties, 
there is a real risk that if the UN did not enjoy, or only partially 
enjoyed immunity from prosecution, the UN would be exposed to 
claims by parties to the conflict and summoned before national 
courts of law of the country in which the conflict takes place. In 
view of the sensitivity of the conflicts in which the UN may be 
involved this might include situations in which the UN is 
summoned for the sole reason of obstructing any action undertaken 
by the Security Council, or even preventing it altogether. It is not 
inconceivable, either, that the UN is summoned in countries where 
the judiciary is not up to the requirements set by the ECHR. The 
immunity from prosecution granted to the UN therefore is closely 
connected to the public interest pertaining to keeping peace and 
safety in the world.
63
 
Neither the plaintiffs’ allegations that the UN had failed to do enough 
to prevent the Srebrenica genocide, nor the fact that the UN had failed to 
 
 
 63. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations), ¶ 5.7 (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/ 
Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an unofficial 
English version). Many commentators feel that the negative consequences and risk of exposure to 
biased courts or politicized proceedings has been vastly overstated. See Gaillard & Pingel-Lenuzza, 
supra note 33, at 5–8; Paust, supra note 33, at 10; Julia Werzer, The UN Human Rights Obligations 
and Immunity: An Oxymoron Casting a Shadow on the Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and 
East Timor, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L LAW, 105, 140 (2008) (“Even if one accepts the argument that there 
are several reasons against subjecting UN organs and personnel operating on the basis of a Chapter VII 
mandate to local courts, the UN is under the obligation to respect and protect international human 
rights. In case the human right of access to a court is restricted, the availability of effective alternative 
legal remedies has to be ensured.”); Elizabeth Abraham, The Sins of the Savior: Holding the United 
Nations Accountable to International Human Rights Standards for Executive Order Detentions in Its 
Mission in Kosovo, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 1291, 1334 (2003) (“[I]f the [Secretary-General] feared the lack 
of independence from a local judiciary, even with international judges, the U.N. should have provided 
for the hybridization of authority rather than complete usurpation of judicial involvement.”); A.S. 
MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES: ASPECTS OF THEIR LEGAL 
RELATIONSHIP 271 (1997).  
 Other scholars rely on the same concerns cited by the Dutch Court of Appeals to maintain the 
legitimacy of the UN’s immunity. Robert, supra note 1, at 1460; Charles H. Brower, International 
Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 92 (2000) 
(“[N]ational prejudices still threaten the work of international organizations. These prejudices justify 
the continued existence of international immunities and the maintenance of decision-making authority 
at the international level.”); Rawski, supra note 46, at 129. 
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establish an alternative forum where the claimants could have their case 
against the UN heard were sufficiently “compelling” to justify a finding 
that the grant of immunity was disproportionate to its objectives.
64
 With 
respect to the first of these claims, the Dutch Court of Appeals observed 
that the UN had neither committed nor assisted in the commission of the 
Srebrenica genocide.
65
 Moreover, although the accusations that the UN 
had failed to prevent the genocide were “serious,” setting aside the 
immunity on the grounds suggested by the plaintiffs might “be latched 
onto too easily [by other courts], which could lead to misuse.”66 
Guido den Dekker and Jessica Schechinger, academics who researched 
the case, have called attention to the insinuation that the Dutch Court of 
Appeals might have withdrawn the UN’s immunity had the organization 
been accused of the “more serious” crimes of committing or assisting in 
the commission of genocide, as opposed to the “lesser” wrong of failing to 
prevent the Srebrenica massacre.
67
 Although the Court of Appeals did not 
explain its reason for drawing this distinction, the disparity can perhaps be 
justified on the basis of the jus cogens nature of the prohibitions of 
genocide versus the treaty-norm status of the latter affirmative duties.
68
 
Thus, the Dutch Court of Appeals has distinguished itself as the only 
national court to ever suggest that the “absolute” immunity of the UN 
might be curtailed on grounds other than a conflict with a constitutional 
right.
69
 
 
 
 64. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.7; see also Cumaraswamy, 
supra note 29, ¶ 61 (showing the ICJ indicated that States could disagree for the “most compelling 
reasons with the Secretary-General’s decision to not waive immunity”).  
 65. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.10. 
 66. Id.  
 67. See also id.; Dekker, supra note 29, at 6–7. They have also identified a confusing aspect of 
this ruling, namely that because “the general interest connected with UN immunity . . . and the risk of 
abuse of domestic court proceedings would not change [even if the UN had been accused of the ‘more 
serious’ offenses], making it unlikely that the test of proportionality would result in a different 
outcome.” Id. at 6. 
 68. For more on the nature of the prohibition of genocide as a jus cogens norm, see Andrea 
Gattini, Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment, 
18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 695, 697, 702 (2007), and Stephen J. Toope, Does International Law Impose a 
Duty upon the United Nations to Prevent Genocide?, 46 MCGILL L.J. 187 (2000). 
 69. American courts have occasionally demonstrated an awareness that the grant of immunity to 
international organizations may conflict with constitutional law demands that the state provide a forum 
for the settlement of disputes. Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985); People 
v. Mark S. Weiner, 378 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976). However, “in the near-totality of cases 
national courts scrupulously stick to the UN’s immunity.” Jan Wouters & Pierre Schmitt, Challenging 
Acts of Other United Nations’ Organs, Subsidiary Organs and Officials 8 (Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 49, 2010), available at http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/ 
publications/working%20papers/new_series/wp49.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
744 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:727 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the Dutch Court of Appeals examined whether the UN’s 
failure to constitute an alternative forum through which the plaintiffs could 
seek redress could compel the Dutch courts to revoke the organization’s 
immunity.
70
 Whereas the District Court had declined to consider this claim 
at all,
71
 the Court of Appeals subsumed this question into its analysis of 
the right of access. The Court of Appeals conceded that the UN had failed 
to establish an adjudicatory mechanism capable of compensating the 
plaintiffs, and that the status-of-forces agreement negotiated between the 
Netherlands and the UN provided no means by which to hold the 
organization accountable;
72
 however, the court concluded that the right of 
access to a court had not been impaired because alternative forums existed 
where the appellants could hold “two categories of parties liable for the 
damages incurred by the Mothers of Srebrenica, namely the perpetrators of 
the genocide and the State.”73 With respect to the claims against the 
Netherlands, which the Association had reproached “for the same things as 
the UN,” Dutch courts would give a “substantive assessment of the claim” 
even if the State sought to avoid responsibility by arguing that the actions 
of Dutchbat soldiers were attributable to the UN.
74
  
This aspect of the Dutch Court of Appeals decision is problematic to 
the extent that it equates the claim lodged against the Dutch state with that 
of the claim lodged against the UN. An allocation of liability between co-
defendants must be fair from the perspective of the injured party, and by 
excluding the UN from the class of defendants against whom the 
applications could seek compensation, the Court of Appeals failed to 
 
 
 70. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers of Srebrenica/the 
Netherlands & the United Nations), ¶ 5.11 (Neth.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/ 
Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the case in an 
unofficial English version).  
 71. Id. ¶ 5.14. 
 72. The UN and Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed in May 1993 that “any dispute or claim of a 
private law character to which UNPROFOR or any member thereof is a party and over which the 
courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have jurisdiction . . . shall be settled by a standing claims 
commission to be established for that purpose.” Agreement on the Status of the United Nations 
Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N.–Bosn. & Herz., art. 48, May 15, 1993, 1722 
U.N.T.S. 78, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/29/16/00056765.pdf. No such 
commission was ever formed. M.R. GERRITSEN ET AL., VAN DIEPEN VAN DER KROEF ADVOCATEN, 
PLEADINGS AGAINST UN IMMUNITY, ¶ 57 (June 18, 2008), available at http://www.vandiepen.com. 
 73. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.13; see also Dekker, supra 
note 29, at 7–8 (“[W]ith respect to the responsible political and military leaders of the Bosnian-Serb 
army, which the Court of Appeal apparently has in mind . . . this argument seems a bit far-fetched, 
because . . . a civil claim against an individual soldier of the Bosnian-Serb Army . . . would (in 
principle) be passed on to the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”). 
 74. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.12. 
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respect the right of the injured party to have its damages completely 
redressed. 
In the case of multilateral peace operations, illegal conduct will occur 
as a result of a series of individual decisions and discrete acts by multiple 
defendants. A different Dutch appellate court implicitly acknowledged this 
in a decision involving facts similar to those at issue in Mothers of 
Srebrenica: 
The question whether the State had ‘effective control’ over the 
conduct of Dutchbat . . . must be answered in view of the 
circumstances of the case. This does not only imply that 
significance should be given to the question whether that conduct 
constituted the execution of a specific instruction, issued by the UN 
or the State, but also to the question whether, if there was no such 
specific instruction, the UN or the State had the power to prevent 
the conduct concerned. 
When applying the ‘effective control’ criterion it is important to 
establish that it is not disputed that the state that provides the troops 
keeps control over the personnel matters of the assigned soldiers, 
who are and will remain employed by the state, as well as the power 
to take disciplinary action and start criminal proceedings against 
these soldiers. It is not disputed either that the state that provides the 
troops at all times preserves the power to withdraw the troops and to 
discontinue their participation in the mission.
75
 
Although some actions may be attributable to two or more entities with 
“effective control” over the impugned conduct, others will only be able to 
be attributed to a single actor, with the consequence that the plaintiffs may 
remain uncompensated for some specific wrongful acts if a party were 
excluded from the litigation.  
Moreover, the court neglected to take into account that the conduct of 
individual co-defendants has to be evaluated in light of the legal 
obligations imposed on each. Dutch law, for example, provides for 
liability for the acts of Dutchbat troops under Bosnian law,
76
 whereas the 
 
 
 75. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 5 juli 2011, NJF 2011, (H.N./Netherlands) ¶¶ 5.8–5.9 
(Neth.) (emphasis added), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BR538 
(translating the case in an unofficial English version). The appellate court went on to examine specific 
decisions and instructions of the Dutch government that gave rise to its liability. Id. ¶¶ 5.17–5.19. For 
more on dual or multiple attribution of responsibility for conduct, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 
56th Sess., May 3–June 4, July 4–Aug. 6, 2004, U.N. Doc. No. A/59/10; GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 
10 at 101 (2004). 
 76. Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appelas], H.N., ¶ 6.3. The court also tested the impugned 
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conduct of the UN forces in Bosnia may be reviewable on the basis of 
customary international law and the UN-Bosnia and Herzegovina Status of 
Forces Agreement.
77
 In practical terms, this means that even where 
responsibility for a specific act or decision can be attributed to multiple 
co-defendants as a matter of fact, whether liability attaches to a particular 
defendant for a specific act will depend on the scope of the law to which 
each defendant is bound. 
The Dutch Court of Appeals made a critical error in failing to 
recognize the importance of the UN as a party to the lawsuit, whose 
presence is essential to ensuring that the plaintiffs might have their 
damages redressed completely. While this equitable concern may not have 
been sufficiently compelling to justify withdrawing the grant of immunity, 
the Court of Appeals should have engaged in a more robust and satisfying 
balancing of these factors as part of its proportionality analysis.
78
  
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is inevitable that, in the course of peace support operations, UN 
forces will injure civilians and damage their property. Despite this, there 
have been few cases in which individuals have attempted to bring suit 
against the UN, alleging its responsibility for wrongful conduct. In the 
only other known instance, which occurred over forty years ago, the 
Belgian Civil Tribunal was asked in Manderlier to set aside the immunity 
of the UN and hold it accountable for violations of customary international 
law.
79
 In the course of deciding the claims, the Belgian court rejected the 
 
 
conduct against Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR and Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR, insofar as these 
principles “belong to the most fundamental legal principles of civilized nations” and, in the case of the 
ICCPR, are binding on the Netherlands through the Bosnian Constitution. Id. Interestingly, while the 
Netherlands in H.N. had argued that the ECHR and ICCPR were “not applicable,” the Court assumed 
that “the State did not mean to assert that it does not need to comply with the standards that are laid 
down in art. 2 and 3 ECHR and art. 6 and 7 ICCPR in peacekeeping missions . . . .” Id. ¶ 6.3. 
 77. Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
May 15, 1993, 1722 U.N.T.S. 77. 
 78. The Court of Appeals may have also inadvertently exposed the Dutch state to liability before 
the ECHR for unduly interfering with the Association’s liberty to decide how to bring its case. See Jan 
Paulsson, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137–38 (2005) (discussing Philis v. Greece, 
App. No. 12750/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 741, (1991)); Dekker, supra note 29, at 7 
(questioning whether the potential alternative remedies identified by the Court are real); Spijkers, 
supra note 35, at 218–19. 
 79. In 2000, preliminary steps were taken by two Australian attorneys to sue the UN on behalf of 
two Rwandan families for the organization’s complicity in the Rwandan genocide. Charges do not 
appear to have actually been filed, as the UN threatened to invoke its immunity from suit before 
national courts. Karen MacGregor, Survivors Sue U.N. for ‘‘Complicity’ in Rwanda Genocide, THE 
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application of Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and ECHR Article 6, holding that the former was a mere “collection of 
recommendations” lacking legal force, and that the latter was “concluded 
between fourteen European states only” and could not be imposed on the 
UN.
80
 Compared to Manderlier, the Dutch Court of Appeals decision in 
Mothers of Srebrenica is remarkable, inasmuch as the court did not deny 
the obligatory nature of the right of access. Indeed, the decision is a 
testament to the newfound willingness of contemporary judges to justify 
the UN’s immunity on the basis of its consistency with other norms of 
international law. Unfortunately for potential plaintiffs, the Dutch Court of 
Appeals decision probably also reflects the high-water mark for claims 
brought against the UN before national courts. The Mothers of Srebrenica 
litigation is a rarity, in that it involves sympathetic plaintiffs with a 
legitimate legal complaint against the UN who have no other forums in 
which their claim could otherwise be brought.
81
 If a national court is 
unwilling to set aside the immunity of the UN under such circumstances, it 
is indeed difficult to imagine a situation in which the right of access would 
be great enough to justify setting aside the grant of immunity.  
 
 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 11, 2000), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ africa/survivors-sue-un-for-
complicity-in-rwanda-genocide-727146.html. 
 80. Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies et l’État Belge, Brussels Civil Tribunal, 11 
May 1966, 45 I.L.R. 446, 451–52 (Belg.); Court of Appeals of Brussels, 15 September 1969, 69 I.L.R. 
139 (Belg.). See M. R. GERRITSEN ET AL., VAN DIEPEN VAN DER KROEF ADVOCATEN, WRIT OF 
SUMMONS para. 463 (June 18, 2008), available at http://www.vandiepen.com/en/srebrenica/detail/79-
1%29-writ-of-summons-%284-june-2007%29.html (“To the extent that the numbers argument in 1966 
was valid, that is at present certainly not the case given that now 46 countries have acceded to the 
EECHR. The second argument, that the EECHR does not apply to the UN, is also incorrect. The 
EECHR confers on civilians a direct right of access to the court, which means that the court before 
which a claim is brought must allow access. By so doing it is not imposing the EECHR on the UN, but 
rather offering protection to the acknowledged—also by the UN—human right of access to the 
court.”). Reinisch argues that the approach of the Civil Tribunal has “not gained persuasive strength 
over the years,” but the numbers argument appears to have played a role in the recently decided 
UNESCO case. UNESCO, supra note 57, at 484–85 (noting that the obligation to provide for the 
immunity of UN organs is “owed to virtually the entire international community” and arguing that 
there is “no room for ‘reading down’ the provisions of the 1947 Convention in order to take account of 
the provisions of the subsequent ECHR, a treaty which is binding upon only a minority of the parties 
to the 1947 Convention.”). Contra Reinisch & Weber, supra note 32, at 77. 
 81. The Dutch Court of Appeals itself noted in dicta that it “regrets the fact that the UN has not 
instigated an alternative course of proceedings in conformity with their obligations under Article 
VIII(29) in the preamble and under (a) of the Convention for claims as this in order to waive the 
immunity from prosecution.” Hof’s-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals] 30 mart 2010 (Ass’n of Mothers 
of Srebrenica/the Netherlands & the United Nations), ¶ 5.14 (Neth.), available at http://www.hague 
justiceportal.net/Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf (translating the 
case in an unofficial English version). 
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The Mothers of Srebrenica Association has appealed the decision to the 
Dutch Supreme Court
82
 and has expressed their readiness to bring the 
Netherlands before the European Court if necessary.
83
 As a test case for 
claims against the UN, the ultimate outcome of the case has far reaching 
implications for peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century. It is 
hoped that, as the case works its way through the courts, a persuasive 
analytical framework for balancing the rights and entitlements at stake 
capable of withstanding the substantial scrutiny to which it will be 
subjected will emerge.  
 
 
 82. See M.R. GERRITSEN ET AL., VAN DIEPEN VAN DER KROEF ADVOCATEN, WRIT OF 
CASSATION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NETHERLANDS, para. 8.6 (July 1, 2010), available at http: 
//www.vandiepen.com/en/srebrenica/detail/113-8%29-writ-of-cassation.html (providing a statement on 
behalf of Mothers of Srebrenica). The plaintiffs have also requested that the Supreme Court refer the 
case to the European Court of Justice, arguing that the Court of Justice is the body charged with 
determining whether a grant of absolute immunity “tallies with the law of the European Community.” 
Id. The same request was made of, and rejected by, the Dutch Court of Appeals. Hof’s-Gravenhage 
[Court of Appeals], Mothers of Srebrenica, ¶ 5.13. 
 83. Simon Jennings, Dutch Court Rules UN Enjoys Absolute Immunity, IWPR (July 14, 2008), 
http://www.groundreport.com/World/Dutch-Court-Rules-UN-Enjoys-Absolute-Immunity/2865032. It 
is not clear, however, that plaintiffs fall within the jurisdictional provisions of Article 6 of the ECHR. 
ECHR, supra note 1, art. 6. 
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